This article is wriiten by Ms.Sreelakshmi Kishore. She is a 4th year student at Government Law College, Thrissur.
CITATION : AIR 1993 SC 477
BENCH : M.H. Kania, M.N Venkatachaliah , S. Ranavel Pandian , T.K Thommen, A.M. Ahmadi, Kuldip Singh, P.B Sawant, R.M. Sahai, B.P Jeevan Reddy
JUDGEMENT : 16th November , 1992
INTRODUCTION
The case of Indra Sawhney v. Union of India AIR 1993 SC 477 was a landmark Supreme Court case addressed by the nine – judge constitutional bench regarding the constitutional validity of the 27% reservation for Other Backward Classes (OBCs) in government jobs and educational institutions, as recommended by the Mandal Commission. This judgement brought about a number of constitutional reforms in the annals of Indian History. Moreover, it addressed a wide range of questions addressing the criteria for reservation under Article 16(4) , legitimacy of sub – classification, scope of th term ‘ backward classes’ and administrative efficiency under Article 335 of the Constitution of India.
BACKGROUND AND FACTS OF THE CASE
After the Indian Constitution came into force on 26 th November 1950, people demanded that the Central Government should create reservation provisions for Other Backward Classes (OBCs), similar to those which was in existence in some southern states prior to the framing of Constitution .To address this, the Central Government established the First Backward Classes Commission known as Kaka Kalelkar Commission on January 29, 1953 under Article 340(2) of the Indian Constitution . Article 340 provides for the appointment of a commission to investigate the conditions of the backward classes. The Kaka Kalelkar Commission, after meticulously delving into the pathetic conditions and miserabilities faced by the backward classes submitted its report on March 30,1955. Besides, the Commission identified 2,399 castes as socially and economically backward in its report. However, the Central Government rejected the report on 1961 because it did not agree with the criteria used to identify backward classes.
Later, on 16 August 1961, the Central Government asked State Governments to create their own tests and fix parameters to identify backward classes. The Centre also directed that these tests should be based mainly on economic factors rather than caste. States were also given the freedom to prepare and publish their own lists of backward classes autonomously .
The Central Government permitted each State Government to create and publish its own list of backward classes for giving reservations under Article 15 and Article 16 .However, the Central Government did not provide reservations for OBCs in central services, even though it continued to give reservations to Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs).
On 1st January , 1979 , Mandal Commission was set up by Prime Minister Morarji Desai’s Janata Party government with the responsibility to “identify the socially or educationally backward classes” of India. The Commission was devoted with the task of formulating the criteria for deciding the matter of eligibility with regard to the reservation in public sector jobs. It was chaired by B. P. Mandal who was a member of Parliament of India , and was assigned with considering the question of reservations for people in order to alleviate caste prejudice, as well as determining backwardness using eleven educational , economic, and social indicators.
The Mandal Commission determined that approximately 52% of the nation’s population consisted of Other Backward Classes (OBCs). In its initial deliberations, it contended that the proportion of reservations within governmental employment ought to correspond directly to this demographic percentage. Nevertheless, such a decision would have contravened an earlier Supreme Court judgment, which unequivocally formulated that the aggregate extent of reservations must not exceed 50%. Given that 22.5% of existing reservations had already been allocated to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, the quota for OBCs was consequently restricted to 27%, thereby ensuring compliance with the judicial ceiling. Furthermore, the Commission extended its identification of backward classes to include sections of the non-Hindu population.
After the Mandal Commission submitted its report, it was not implemented immediately. The Janata Dal government that had initiated it collapsed, and when the Congress government returned to power, they did not act on the report for many years. In 1989, V.P. Singh’s Janata Dal came back to power and issued an Office Memorandum to implement the Mandal Commission’s recommendations, . This led to widespread protest and violent anti-reservation protests across the country, with several students even resorting to self-immolation. Amidst this unrest, the Janata Dal government also fell, and the Congress government under P.V. Narasimha Rao took charge in 1991. They issued another Office Memorandum to implement the Mandal Commission Report but added key modifications such as reservations would favor poorer sections within the SEBCs, 27% quota would be given, and an additional 10% reservation would go to economically weaker groups not covered by any reservation scheme. Despite these steps, violent protests continued and India suffered heavy loss of life and property. In 1991 , the Supreme Court took over the Public interest litigation challenging the implementation of the Mandal Commission report filed by group of petitioners, led by Indira Sawhney, a law student criticising the legality of the Mandal Commission’s recommendations, asserting that a reservation framework rooted solely in caste identification contravened the constitutional principles of equality and non-discrimination. They argued that affirmative action should instead be anchored in economic criteria, which they considered a more appropriate and equitable basis for state intervention.
The matter was subsequently referred to a nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India. During the proceedings, the bench sought further clarification from the Union Government regarding the specific criteria underscoring the proposed 27% reservation for Other Backward Classes. It has been contended, however, that the government’s submissions failed to provide a sufficiently detailed or satisfactory explanation of the parameters set forth in the office memorandum, thereby raising concerns about the adequacy of the policy’s justificatory framework.
ISSUES
Whether Article 16(4) to be understood as an exception to Article 16(1), and does it exclusively govern the constitutional provision for reservations in public employment?
Whether the backward classes can be further categorised into backward and more backward categories ?
Whether the reservations for Backward Classes apply exclusively to initial appointments, or can they be validly extended to promotions within public services as well?
Whether the reservations permitted under Article 16(4), whether independently or in conjunction with Article 16(1), lawfully comes within the 50% ceiling established in prior judicial precedents?
ARGUMENTS OF THE PETITIONER
Contentions with regard to :
- Administrative inefficiency
The contention advanced by the counsel for the petitioner was that implementation of the Commission’s recommendations would lead to a decline in administrative standards which is enunciated in Article 335 , allowing individuals with comparatively lower qualifications to replace meritocracy with mediocrity. They argued that such a shift would undermine morale within public institutions, accelerate caste-based identities, and deepen societal divisions between so-called forward and backward groups. Furthermore, it was argued that the policy could inadvertently make backwardness as a vested interest and create conditions leading to internal disagreement and centrifugal forces within the nation.
- Cap of 50 % in reservation
According to the counsel for the petitioner , the ultimatum of Article 16(4) is to facilitate the advancement of the “backward classes.” Any rigid limitation on the extent of reservation would undermine the very purpose of this Fundamental Right. Consequently, if the circumstances so require, the quantum of reservation could, in principle, extend even up to 100 per cent. The Supreme Court in M.R Balaji And Others v. State of Mysore 1963 AIR 649 ruled that reservation shall not exceed 50 % by declaring that Article 15(4) is not exhaustive . But it was argued by the counsel for the petitioner that it was mere an obiter dicta and is excluded from the purview of the law declared by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution . The Counsel relied on K.C Vasant Kumar and Anr v. State of Karnataka [ 1985] AIR 1495 ( SC) where the court condemned that the rule of 50 % is a rule of caution only and not an inflexible rule . According to the court , equality of opportunity revolves around two dominant principles ; one being the traditional value of equality of opportunity and the second being the newly appreciated – though not only conceived idea of equality of results.
- Creamy layer principle
The counsel , advanced a slightly different way of argument while maintaining that the expression “backward classes of citizens” in Article 16(4) cannot be equated with “backward castes.” The counsel took reliance on Article 38(2) and Article 46 by emphasizing that the Constitution seeks to reduce inequalities of income not only among individuals but also among groups, and aims to promote the economic interests and welfare of weaker sections of society. He argued that economic criteria constitute a significant component in identifying backward classes and should also be applied for excluding advanced sections who can be referred to as creamy layer.
The counsel submitted that a secular socialist society , can never grant unfettered considerations to backward classes on the basis of caste which would only perpetuate and accentuate caste differences and generate antagonism and antipathy between castes. The counsel advocated that a national concensus is vital to introduce reservations for ‘other backward classes’ under Article 16(4).
- Reservation in promotion
The petitioner contends that the reservation of appointments or posts envisaged under Clause (4) of Article 16 is confined exclusively to the stage of initial entry into State service, namely direct recruitment. It is argued that extending reservations beyond this point to promotions amounts to a form of “double reservation,” and that applying such provisions at successive promotional levels would, in effect, multiply the reservation benefits correspondingly. It is further submitted that reservation in promotions enables members of reserved categories to augment their career advancement disproportionately, thereby “leapfrogging” their counterparts in the open category.
ARGUMENTS OF THE RESPONDENTS
Contentions with regard to :
- Interpretation of Article 16(4)
The reservation permitted under Article 16(4) is not intended for individual backward citizens but for backward classes of citizens. Caste is a relevant and may even be the predominant factor in determining backwardness. In fact, most State lists of backward classes are prepared primarily on the basis of caste, and such lists have been incessantly upheld by the Court. Article 16(2) prohibits discrimination on any of the enumerated grounds. However, protective discrimination based on one or more of these grounds in combination with other relevant considerations does not fall within this exclusion . Thus, when reservation is provided for a backward class of citizens, the bar under Article 16(2) is not attracted, even if the backward classes are identified with reference to caste. This is because the reservation is granted not merely on the basis of caste, but because these castes/classes are backward and inadequately represented in State services.
- Criteria for backwardness
The counsel submitted that economic criteria may be employed as one of the indicators for identification of backward classes but once a backward class is identified as such, there is no question of excluding any one from that class on the basis of income or means or on any other economic criterion. The reservation granted should be contemplated as a historical compensation for their backwardness and their sufferings from generation to generation.
- Differentiation between backward and more backward classes
There is no legal bar as to the sub categorisation of backward and more backward classes. The line of demarcation should be clearly drawn so that any particular cast shall not take any undue advantages by gobbling the opportunities of others. Unlike Article 15(4), Article 16(4) does not explicitly mention the provision for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. However, separate treatment of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for the purpose of granting reservation would not be an impracticable one. In addition to this, the respondents largely depended on the scheme of Andhra Pradesh which classifies the backward classes into A,B,C and D categories in accordance with their respective strength.
JUDGEMENT
The Court held that Article 16(4) is not an exception to Article 16(1), but rather a specific instance of the constitutionally permissible classification inherent in and authorised by Clause (1), and therefore both provisions must be read harmoniously. It affirmed that the term “backward class” in Article 16(4) denotes a social class, as derived from the purpose and context of the provision, and that unlike Article 15(4), which contains qualifying language, Article 16(4) is framed broadly so as to encompass Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and all other socially and educationally backward classes. The Court further clarified that reservation based primarily on economic criteria does not fall within Article 16(4); such measures, if considered valid, must derive their legitimacy from Article 16(1) and remain subject to the broader term equality as mandated in the Constitution. In addressing the scope of reservations, the Court maintained that the benefit under Article 16(4) applies only at the stage of initial appointment and does not extend to promotions, thereby rejecting the permissibility of reservation in promotional avenues. Consistent with its earlier ruling in M.R Balaji And Others v. State of Mysore1963AIR 649 , the Court reaffirmed the 50 per cent ceiling on cumulative reservations, holding that the total reservation for SCs, STs, and OBCs must not exceed this limit. The court also ruled that reservations through an executive order is not necessarily invalid. However, if reservations are being introduced in the Union services for the first time , it should be more convenient to place it before the Parliament. The Court also upheld the constraints of the carry-forward rule as delineated in T.Devadasan v. Union of India AIR 1964 SC 179 The court also overruled the decision in General Manager , Southern Railway v. Rangachari [ 1962 ] 2 SCR 586 where it observed that reservation would be permissible if the ground for reservation is pure merit to ensure the representation of candidates from backward classes in higher posts in government services .
AFTERMATH OF THE JUDGEMENT
> These judicial developments led to important constitutional responses aimed at addressing structural inequalities in public employment and education. The Seventy-Seventh Constitutional Amendment Act, 1995 introduced Article 16(4A), empowering the State to provide reservation in promotion in favour of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. This was followed by the Eighty-First Constitutional Amendment Act, 2000, which inserted Article 16(4B) to permit the carry-forward of unfilled reserved vacancies to subsequent years, thereby seeking to remedy persistent backlogs in representation. Subsequently, the Eighty-Fifth Constitutional Amendment Act further strengthened Article 16(4A) by incorporating the concept of “consequential seniority” for SC and ST candidates promoted through reservation.
In a later phase of constitutional reform, the One Hundred and Third Constitutional Amendment Act introduced a 10 per cent reservation for Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) in government employment and educational institutions. This amendment modified Articles 15 and 16 to allow special provisions for economically disadvantaged persons who do not fall within the existing reservation framework for SCs, STs, or OBCs. Accordingly, Article 15(6) enables affirmative measures for EWS in educational institutions, while Article 16(6) provides for reservation in public appointments and posts. Eligibility under the EWS category is determined on the basis of prescribed economic and asset-based criteria, including an annual family income below ₹8 lakh, limited agricultural landholding, and restrictions on residential property ownership. The EWS reservation is thus intended to benefit economically disadvantaged individuals within the general category and is designed to operate uniformly across educational institutions and public employment.
CONCLUSION
In Indra Sawhney, the Supreme Court adopted a balanced approach by rejecting economic criteria as the sole basis of backwardness and introducing the creamy layer principle to prevent misuse of reservations. While this marked a progressive step, later constitutional amendments and policies indicate that reservation has increasingly been influenced by political considerations rather than genuine social reform.
Although reservations have contributed to the upliftment of backward communities, historical inequalities persist. In this context, it is essential that the legal framework governing reservations is applied with clarity and restraint. The judiciary must ensure that the creamy layer principle is effectively enforced so that benefits reach the truly disadvantaged, failing which the constitutional ideals of equality and fairness would be compromised.